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Abstract: The international corporate governance debate largely builds on the assumption that 
an ideal and effective board model is one that improves the formal independence of board of 
directors especially the independent directors in decision-making process that ultimately leads to 
maximize the firm value.   The aim of this study is to make a comparative study between the main 
corporate governance models used globally by scrutinizing strengths and weaknesses for each 
one, in the sense to determine which one is the most effective model allowing the independence 
and if it can be adapted to different economic systems, in order to be applied on a scale as large. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Corporate governance acts as a framework to safeguard and control the relevant 
players (managers, employees, customers, shareholders, executive directors/managers, 
suppliers and the board of directors) in the market. In fact, it is a mechanism which is 
used by the board of directors to improve the value of the shareholders by controlling the 
managers’ actions. The literature of corporate governance distinguishes between internal 
corporate governance mechanisms and institutions that are external to firms (Monks, 
R.A.G. and Minow, N., 2004).  Capital markets are external; an internal example would 
be the board of directors. Consequently, corporate governance mechanisms are an 
interaction between the institutional structures and individuals who immediately or 
ultimately impact on the decision making process of the companies. This should include 
an alignment of the interests of shareholders, managers and stakeholders. This system or 
process consists of internal and external corporate governance mechanism that leads 
better company performance and includes the ways in which suppliers of finance to firms 
assure themselves of getting a return on their investment (Shleifer, A., &Vishny, R. W., 
1997). In this sense, a good corporate governance covers the laws, rules, and factors that 
control the operations of a firm (Gillan& Starks, 1998), as well as the relationships 
between different people who are involved in the system, i.e. management, boards of 
directors, shareholders and other stakeholders (OECD, 1999). In essence, a corporate 
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governance system provides the structure through which the objectives of the firm are set 
and the means by which these objectives are attained and monitored.  
    Corporate governance is largely about organisational and management performance. It 
is about how an organisation is managed, its corporate and other structures, its policies 
and the ways in which it deals with its various stakeholders. It is concerned with 
structures and processes for decision making and with control and behaviour that support 
effective accountability for performance outcomes. Corporate governance is about the 
system of framework of laws, regulations and institutions with internal and external 
controls mechanism by which companies are directed and controlled which is based on 
the principles of integrity, fairness, transparency and accountability. There are various 
actors involved in corporate governance mechanism in which board of directors holds the 
apex position in the internal corporate mechanism in aligning the interest of managers 
and shareholders. A board is consists of executive and non- executive directors including 
independent directors perceived as a valuable company assets for achieving greater 
company performance and long- term sustainability of company. “Corporate Governance 
refers to that blend of law, regulation and appropriate voluntary private sector practices 
which enables the corporation to attract financial and human capital, perform efficiently 
and thereby perpetuate itself by generating long term economic value for its shareholders, 
while respecting the interests of stakeholders and society as a whole” (Ira M. Millstein, 
2003, Developing Corporate Governance Codes of Best Practices, Volume I, Global 
Corporate Governance). 
    Corporate governance structure and model varies significantly among different 
countries. In a highly dispersed shareholding system, such as is the case in the USA, 
members of the board of directors are granted the responsibility of monitoring executives. 
Internal corporate governance systems in Germany and Japan, on the other hand, rest 
with large shareholders. This is because their business and legal systems allow 
concentrated and cross shareholdings. The actions of these large shareholders appear to 
be a combination of aggressively controlling the management as well as a friendly one. 
Corporate financial managers are expected to act on behalf of shareholders, with the goal 
of obtaining a reasonable return on their investments. Once the board fails in its duty, 
share prices would fall and institutional shareholders with a large stake would assume the 
responsibility of the board of directors. These actions could either be supportive or 
unfriendly towards the incumbent management team. In widely-held corporations without 
block holders, the shareholders as principals are protected against wrongdoing by the 
board through the classic instrument of company law, i.e., duties and liabilities of the 
directors. In practice, however, the real principal-agent problem in corporations with 
concentrated ownership is not between the shareholders and the board, but between 
minority shareholders and the controlling or block holding shareholders. In many 
countries, for example the United States, Germany, France, the Netherlands and 
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Argentina, shareholder associations play an important role for shareholder protection and 
for corporate governance in general. In others, like India, Switzerland there is no such 
kind of associations. 
2. BOARD MODELS 
   A comparative approach to the organization of corporate boards gives rise to a number 
of research questions that are related to the formal independence of one-tier and two-tier 
boards in Anglo-Saxon and continental European countries. The diversity of board roles 
in the governance of corporations, differences in the leadership structure, the organization 
structure and the composition of board provide a wide range of board models in different 
countries. Regional and international developments have resulted in two prominent 
models- the Anglo- Saxon one-tier board model and two-tier board model. In general, the 
Anglo- Saxon countries such as USA, UK and Canada have adopted variants of one-tier 
models whereas in majority of European Countries two-tier board model is prevailing. In 
one-tier board model, executive directors and nonexecutive directors operate together in 
one organizational layer (the so-called one tier board). The members of the one-tier board 
are elected by the shareholders, while the members of the management board are usually 
elected by the supervisory board.  Some one-tier boards are dominated by a majority of 
executive directors while others are composed of a majority of non-executive directors. 
In addition, one tier boards can have a board leadership structure that separates the CEO 
and chair positions of the board. One-tier boards can also operate with a board leadership 
structure that combines the roles of the CEO and the chairman. This is called CEO 
duality. One-tier boards also make often use of board committees like audit remuneration 
and nomination committees. Continental European countries such as Germany, Finland 
and the Netherlands have adopted variants of the two-tier board model. In this model, an 
additional organizational layer has been designed to separate the executive function of the 
board from its monitoring function. The supervisory board (the upper layer) is entirely 
composed of non-executive supervisory directors who may represent labor, the 
government and/or institutional investors. The management board (the lower layer) is 
usually composed of executive managing directors. It is generally not accepted by 
corporation laws that corporate statutes foresee in the possibility that directors combine 
the CEO and chairman roles in two-tier boards. Because the CEO has no seat in the 
supervisory board, its board leadership structure is formally independent from the 
executive function. 
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Figure-1: One-Tier and Two-Tier Board Models 
 
Here, variants of One-tier and Two-tire models in selected companies have been discussed as     
follows: 
2.1 The Anglo-Saxon Model 
     Anglo American model also known as unitary board model is one- tier board model 
which is prevailing in Anglo Saxon countries such as USA, UK, Canada and Australia. 
Anglo-Saxon model is characterized by the dominance in the company of independent 
persons and individual shareholders. The manager is responsible to the board of directors 
and shareholders, the latter being especially interested in profitable activities and received 
dividends. It ensures the mobility of investments and their placement from the inefficient 
to the developed areas, but it however feels a lack of strategic development.  In the U.S., 
financial markets activities dominate the allocation of ownership and control rights into 
organizations. Legislation always appeared hostile to concentration, especially in the 
banking industry, but in the recent years there have been notice new regulations 
development, more forced by the new economic trends: the increasing influence of 
boards, investors are increasingly demanding and cautious and managers give more 
importance to key business issues. Enterprises are required to disclose more information 
compared to those Japanese or German. On financial markets (NASDAQ) smaller 
companies are also present, even if some are still in growth and development. Corporate 
governance was encouraged by the work of various associations which have introduced a 
motion to support the shareholders, such as National Association of Investors 
Corporation (founded in 1951) which 
The Supervisory Board 
In Charge of Decision 
Control 
The Management Board 
In Charge of Decision 
Management 
Decision Management The Board of 
Directors 
In Charge & Decision Control 
   Two- Tier Board Model   One-Tier Board Model  
Assumption University-eJournal of Interdisciplinary Research  (AU-eJIR) Vol. 1. Issue.1 2015 
 
ISSN: 2408-1906 Page 84 
 
advises on investments on the stock exchange and National Council of Individual 
Investors, which protects interests of the shareholders in front of regulatory authorities. 
Mainly are considering the transparency and access to information, strengthening the 
relationship between regulators and shareholders, and promoting business ethics. The 
governance model takes place in organizations at three levels: shareholders-directors-
managers, since managers authority derives from the administrators.  
The Anglo-Saxon countries are characterized by the emergence of financial markets 
and strong banking restrictions, especially regarding the holding of shares in companies 
outside the banking sector.  These countries have adopted the variants of this model. 
Anglo-Saxon Model is also referred to as Market Oriented Model of CG because of 
dispersed equity owners. In this model, the ownership is equally divided between 
individual and institutional shareholders who appoint the board of directors. Directors 
appoint and supervise the managers who generally have negligible ownership stake in the 
company. In this model managers acts as a trustee or agent of shareholders of the 
company and they perform their executory duties to run the company. In suck kind of 
board structure generally, disclosure norms are very strict. This model can be depicted 
with the help of the following figure: 
 
 
Figure 2: The Anglo-Saxon Model 
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2.2 The German Model 
    German company law has traditionally relied upon statutory regulation, in which the two-tier 
board model (including co-determination) is firmly rooted. The central feature of internal 
corporate governance lies in the organisational and personal division of management and control 
by a two-tier structure that is mandatory for all public corporations, regardless of size or listing 
in Germany. A German peculiarity is its strong labour co-determination. Companies with 2,000 
workers or more must have half their supervisory board composed of labor representatives; in 
large enterprises, this amounts to ten of twenty board members (in coal and steel it is twenty-
one). The casting vote of the chairman gives slightly more power to shareholders. Labor 
participation is at the heart of industrial democracy, and it is not surprising that German co-
determination finds its roots mainly in the difficult times after World Wars I and II (Hopt, Klaus 
J. & Leynes, P.C., 2004). The notable feature of this model is that the banks in Germany have 
major influence on corporate governance as they provide finance to the German companies. Due 
to this, it is also referred to as a Bank-Oriented System of governance. It is more of an 
institution-oriented structure. The system of corporate governance based on Germanic civil law 
is called Insider Model. There is concentrated ownership which perhaps explains Germany’s less 
developed stock market. 
 
Figure 3: German Model 
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2.3 The Japanese Model 
In this model, the agency problem does not arise as firms are only coordination devices, 
aligning self-interest with that of the stakeholders. There is a Dual Board, the Supervisory Board 
(i.e., Supervisory Directors) and the Management Board (i.e., Executive Board Members The 
Japanese corporate governance is also characterized by the dual structure i.e., the Board of 
Directors and the Executive management. The Executive Management or Representative 
Directors carry out operational functions. This model is also known as business network model. 
In Japan boards are generally tend to be large in size predominated by the executive and often 
ritualistic in nature. In this model, stockholders are positioned at the top as they have the highest 
power to elect the board of directors. The board of directors in turn elects executive 
management, checks their operations and performance and entrusts them responsibility to 
manage the company. The President is one who consult both the supervisory board and executive 
management. In Japan Lending banks who lend money to the company. Shareholder and lending 
bank together appoints the board of directors and the president. The general committee of 
stockholders reserves the right of removal of directors. In addition to this large companies in 
Japan also set up their own operational bodies known as “Jyomukai” i.e. the management 
committee (Senior Executive Committee). The corporate governance structure in the model is 
characterized by high presence of corporate or institutional shareholders, decreased role of main 
banks and the labour union. 
 
Figure 3.4: Japanese Model 
     The Japanese model (similar to the German one) is based on internal control; it does not focus 
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such as banks. As in Germany, major shareholders are actively involved in the management 
process, to stimulate economic efficiency and to penalize its absence. It is also aims to 
harmonize the interests of social partners and employees of the entity. Different countries have 
different board models based on their business legal and organizational environment and other 
factors. For instance the German Model (Insider System) of corporate governance is appropriate 
in a situation where commitment between stakeholders is vital. The Anglo-Saxon Model 
(Outsider System) of CG is more appropriate where technological progress is fast. In the last 
decade, India has been moving towards adoption of the Anglo-Saxon Model of corporate 
governance. The reasons include global political-economy pressures and problems emanating 
from the previous model, viz., the Business House Model of corporate governance. Further, it 
gives importance to shareholders’ interest and promotes product-market competition. The move 
to the Anglo-Saxon Model can help conglomerates to maintain control of their business provided 
their business still remains competitive. Most features of the Anglo-Saxon Model exist in the 
Indian corporate scenario barring a few, such as the dispersed equity ownership. 
 
Table 1: The main features of corporate governance models 
 
Anglo-Saxon                              Continental Europe (German Model) Japanese  
Oriented towards  stock market  banking market  banking market  
Considers  shareholders’ 
property right  
shareholders’ property 
right and company’s 
relationships with its 
employees  
stakeholders’ interests 
(keiretsu)  
Shareholding 
structure  
dispersed  concentrated  concentrated (cross 
possession of shares)  
Management  executive directors 
non-executive 
directors  
Supervisor Board of 
Directors  
Board of Directors 
Revision commission  
Control system  external  internal  internal  
Accounting system  GAAP  IFRS  GAAP and IFRS  
Source: Ungureanu, Mihaela (2013). ‘Models and practices of corporate governance worldwide’ CES Working 
Paper series, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iași, România. 
 
3. THE FORMAL INDEPENDENCE OF ONE-TIER BOARDS 
     Directors who operate in Anglo-Saxon countries have been targeted by financial analysts, 
environmentalists, employees and investors for making policies and designing strategies that 
improve the formal independence of one-tier boards. In practice, business failures, poor 
performance and excessive directors’ pay have put pressures on corporate boards to become 
more independently structured and composed of management. For example, regulatory bodies 
and stock exchanges are modifying listing requirements that aim at changes in the formal 
organization of one-tier boards. Regulators are continuously amending codes of best practices as 
well and are introducing guidelines to improve the formal independence of one-tier corporate 
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boards. Especially one-tier boards with a majority of executive directors have been put under 
pressure to increase the number of independent non-executive directors. Another criticism is 
related to the practice of directors to combine the influential position of the CEO with the 
leadership of the board in one-tier boards (Boyd, 1995). Consequently, directors who operate 
with a board that is composed of a majority of executive directors who are also chaired by the 
CEO are under pressure to modify the composition and the structure of their boards in Anglo-
Saxon countries. 
 
4. THE FORMAL INDEPENDENCE OF TWO-TIER BOARDS 
      A relatively new development in the debate on the formal independence of one-tier boards is 
the recognition that two-tier boards represent a board model that clearly separates executive 
directors’ management tasks from supervisory directors’ monitoring tasks. According to 
Cadbury (1995), the two-tier board model represents a board structure in which the three design 
strategies are formally applied. First, the two-tier board model has two organizational layers that 
separate the executive function of the management board from the monitoring function of the 
supervisory board. It is suggested by Sheridan and Kendall (1992) that the formal separation of 
these boards transparently defines responsibilities of executive managing directors and 
nonexecutive supervisory directors. Second, the supervisory board (the upper layer of the two-
tier board) is entirely composed of non-executive supervisory directors, which secures an 
independent composition of the board. The management board is entirely composed of executive 
managing directors. Third, two-tier boards also provide a formal separation of CEO and 
chairman roles. As such, decision management and decision control are formally separated in the 
two-tier board model. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
     Literature revealed that different countries have different board models. The diversity of 
board roles in the governance of corporations, differences in the leadership structure, the 
organization structure and the composition of board provide a wide range of board models in 
different countries. For instance, the Anglo- Saxon countries such as USA, UK and Canada have 
adopted variants of one-tier models whereas in majority of European Countries two-tier board 
model is prevailing. There is no single board model which is appropriate for every country as 
every economy have their own economic, legal, organizational and social environment. For 
instance the German Model (Insider System) of corporate governance is appropriate in a 
situation where commitment between stakeholders is vital. The Anglo-Saxon Model (Outsider 
System) of corporate governance is more appropriate where technological progress is fast. 
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